I. Questions on Legitimacy
By any standards, the process through which the New Constitution was framed and put into force can only be characterised as unusual. This unusual process gives rise to two questions: whether the amendment procedure under the Old Constitution had been complied with and whether the New Constitution is the result of a democratic constitution-making process. These questions take on particular relevance, as the New Constitution itself claims to be an amendment to the Old Constitution and to have been determined by the constituent peoples.
A. Possible Violation of the Amendment Procedure
Article XII of the New Constitution states that " [t] his Constitution shall enter into force upon signature of the General Framework Agreement as a constitutional act amending and superseding the Constitution of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina." 7 This language may be read as stating that the New Constitution is "the constitutional act amending and superseding" the Old Constitution or that the General Framework Agreement is the "constitutional act amending and superseding" the Old Constitution and the signing of that agreement would bring the New Constitution into effect. The result is the same: a transformative change to the Old Constitution was being effected by the mere signing of the General Framework Agreement.
The Old Constitution apparently did not permit such an unusual amendment process. A proposal to make an amendment to the Old Constitution must comply
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The New Constitution, art. XD.
with certain procedures. The legislation on amending the constitution must "be drafted by the Assembly at the joint session of the Assembly" 8 and be presented to the public for discussion, 9 and must finally be decided at a joint session of all chambers of the Assembly. 10 An amendment can only "be adopted if two-thirds of the total number of the deputies of every chamber of the Assembly vote in favour of it."
11 The plain terms of the New Constitution do not comply with these requirements. It requires neither presentation to the Assembly or the public for debate nor approval by a joint session of the Assembly.
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It is fair to say that the procedural formalities of amending the Old Constitution have not been followed to the letter. The New Constitution was primarily hammered out at the international level in Dayton, rather than drafted by the Assembly. However, one might argue that if the legislature of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina approved the New Constitution before it went into effect, such approval, although not required under the terms of the New Constitution, would support the argument that the essential aspect of the amendment procedure was followed de facto, which should legitimise the amendment. The problem is that the legislature never did so with the requisite two-thirds majority of the total number of the deputies of every chamber (not just those present and voting).
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In all likelihood the New Constitution is not a legitimate amendment to the Old Constitution. The implication of this possible violation of the amendment procedure under the Old Constitution is unclear. Such a violation is probably innocuous and definitely not fatal, if the New Constitution is otherwise legitimate. However, this violation may invalidate part of the language in Article XII regarding its status as an amendment. This means that the New Constitution is not an amendment to the old, but a completely new one. The Old Constitution has simply been jettisoned. A new regime is being established. Such an abandonment of an Old Constitution probably has no effect on the new constitutional order to be instituted under the New Constitution. All the old institutions both political and legal are gone and all the new institutions both political and legal will operate under the authority of the New Constitution. When a dispute relating to rights and duties exist, the New Constitution and laws made under its authority will provide rules of decision for the courts.
14 Nor does this abandonment in itself affect the continuation of the legal existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina under international law as a state. Normally changes in its constitution or government will not affect the personality of a country under international law, unless such changes are substantively incompatible with such personality, which is not the case with the New Constitution.
The abandonment of an old constitution in favour of a new one may be justified, on theories of necessity, in times of great distress or revolution. In times of crisis, the niceties of normal procedure may need to be sacrificed. Under revolutionary theories, the people can always change their government in order to meet the needs of the nation. Both grounds militate in favour of the New Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and each in itself is sufficient to legitimise it. An obvious analogy is the relationship between the United States Constitution and its predecessor-the Articles of Confederation. The Constitution provided that it would go into effect when the ratification conventions of nine states ratified it, 15 while the Articles required any amendment to be first "agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State." 16 The United States Constitution's break from the ratification procedure under the Articles was thus twofold: both with respect to who had the power to ratify and what the voting requirements were. In defence of the Constitution, some alluded to both theories of necessity and revolution, 17 while others stressed grounds of revolution. 18 Respectable scholars have argued that the founding of the United States was unconventional and the departure from the amendment procedure under the Articles is best characterised as 
B. The Undemocratic Origin
In addition to claiming to be an amendment to the Old Constitution, the New Constitution also asserts that "Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with others), and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina ... determinefd]" 20 the Constitution. This obviously is an allusion to the famous phrase "We the People" that appears in the United States Constitution. 21 This catch phrase stands for popular sovereignty, which no doubt is the most legitimate source of authority.
22 If the document is not the work of the people, however, the presence of that famous phrase does not transform it into one of democratic origin.
Does the New Constitution live up to its claim to being a constitution of democratic origin? Theoretically, the people may participate in the drafting and the ratification of a constitution. The people may participate directly through a referendum or plebiscite or indirectly through their representatives. The terms of the New Constitution require neither form of democracy to bring it to life. No ratification by referendum is required for its entry into force. Neither was ratification by the legislature of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or by the legislature of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina or that of Republika Srpska. Instead, the New Constitution went into effect "upon signature of the General Framework Agreement" by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
23 This is an undemocratic birth.
24
Although not necessary to bring the New Constitution into life under its own terms, the "gratuitous" approval of the New Constitution by the legislatures of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska may be considered as de facto blessing of the people and would probably sanitise it. This would support the argument that the New Constitution has been "ratified" by the people through Although each of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska attached to the New Constitution a declaration stating that it approved the New Constitution, see The New Constitution, Annexes, these declarations were not a condition to its entry into force. More importantly, these declarations were decisions of the various governments, and not necessarily those of the people.
their representatives. 25 It is not clear whether such approval has been properly given. It was reported that the legislature of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina supported the Dayton Peace Agreement and therefore presumably the New Constitution, and approved its signing. 26 However, the Bosnian Serb assembly was alternatively reported on 17 December 1995 to have ratified the Dayton Peace Agreement only "conditionally" 27 or decided that it "would not endorse the Bosnian peace accord for the time being." 28 Conditional ratification, if it indeed existed, after the agreement went into effect is troubling and its implication is not clear. It is submitted that the respective legislatures of the Entities should study the situation and act to "ratify" the New Constitution wholeheartedly and unconditionally if such ratification has not in fact been carried out. This proposed ratification should be accomplished as soon as practicable and before any institutions are established so that their existence may not be questioned.
II. Nation-building Aspirations
If the origin of the New Constitution causes one some unease, the nation-building framework set up by it is also troubling. The New Constitution aspires to preserve and continue Bosnia and Herzegovina as one nation under international law, 29 while recognising the essential consequences of the infamous war. To that end, the New Constitution defines citizenship, guarantees human rights, promotes democracy and a market economy, sets up national institutions and grants them certain powers, and establishes a legal system. However, it is questionable whether it has given these institutions the necessary muscle required for the task of building one nation.
A. The Federal Structure
The structure of the nation that the New Constitution attempts to build upon the remains of the protracted war may be best characterised as federal. This is evident in its internal composition and the allocation of power between the national institutions and the component Entities. The New Constitution, art 1(1).
The New Constitution recognises or legitimises the existing consequences of the war 30 by establishing two militarily independent territorial components within Bosnia and Herzegovina, although it does not itself demarcate the boundaries of these two Entities, which was done by other parts of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Article 1(3) states that "Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of the two Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska." Another provision mandates that "under no circumstances shall any armed forces of either Entity enter into or stay within the territory of the other Entity without the consent of the government of the latter and of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
31 As a result, the military conquests by the Bosnia Serbs are solidified, and the military independence of each Entity assured.
In addition to the military independence of the component Entities, each also enjoys almost complete autonomy in its own internal governance. Each Entity regulates its own citizenship. 32 The New Constitution grants only limited powers 33 to the national institutions and beyond these explicit grants of power, the New Constitution decrees that "[a]ll governmental functions and powers not expressly assigned in this Constitution to the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be those of the Entities." 34 Furthermore, each Entity also has certain foreign relations power which a constituent component in a federal nation normally does not have. First, the "Entities shall have the right to establish special parallel relationships with neighbouring states consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina."
35 Secondly, "[e]ach Entity may also enter into agreements with states and international organisations with the consent of the Parliamentary Assembly. The Parliamentary Assembly may provide by law that certain types of agreements do not require such consent."
36 It is not clear whether "special parallel relationships with neighbouring states" require approval of the Parliamentary Assembly. On the one hand, because one provision explicitly states that approval of the Parliamentary Assembly is required while another is silent on this point, one may argue that when the provision is silent no approval is required. On the other hand, one may also contend that the provision requiring approval is a general provision and the other provisions are to be interpreted in light of the general provision, and thus all agreements with another State, in whatever form, must be approved by the Parliamentary Assembly. Nor is it clear what constitutes "special parallel relationships with neighbouring states
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To this extent, it may be considered a constitution "out of the barrel of a gun". consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina," which may have to be ultimately decided by the Constitutional Court
B. Core Values of the New Nation
On the foundations of the federal structure, the New Constitution attempts to build a new nation with several core values. It defines Bosnia and Herzegovina citizenship. 37 It enshrines democracy, although its origin is not a model of democracy. Article 1(2) states that "Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be a democratic state, which shall operate under the rule of law and with free and democratic elections." It puts human rights on a pedestal. 38 Article 11(1) states that "Bosnia and Herzegovina and both Entities shall ensure the highest level of internationally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms." The New Constitution provides that certain rights and fundamental freedoms "shall have priority over all other law,"
39 and that an amendment may not affect these rights adversely.
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Freedom of movement will be guaranteed. Article 1(4) states, "There shall be freedom of movement throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Entities shall not impede full freedom of movement of persons, goods, services, and capital throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Neither Entity shall establish controls at the boundary between the Entities."
C. National Powers and Institutions v. Entities' Powers and Institutions
The New Constitution establishes a national government with limited and enumerated powers. These powers relate to (a) foreign relations, i.e., foreign policy, foreign trade policy, customs policy, immigration, refugee, asylum policy and regulation, international criminal law enforcement, international communication facilities and air traffic control; (b) inter-Entity relations, i.e., inter-Entity criminal law enforcement, common communications facilities, inter-Entity transportation, and finances of the national institutions; and (c) national economy, i.e., currency issuing authority and monetary policy. 41 All other powers belong to the Entities, although the Presidency may decide to facilitate inter-Entity co-operation unless an Entity objects.
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This no doubt will serve as a principle of interpretation mandating that the national powers be interpreted strictly.
Another important national feature is the pre-emptive power of national law. The New Constitution places the New Constitution and decisions of the national institu-
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Ibid., ait 1(7 and, as such, apparently over even other provisions of the New Constitution. As decisions of the national institutions, treaties should pre-empt laws of the Entities.
To carry out these national powers, the New Constitution establishes the following national institutions: the Parliamentary Assembly, the Presidency, the Constitutional Court, and the Central Bank. These institutions and their powers will be described briefly here and their decision-making process will be analysed in Part III.
The Parliamentary Assembly consists of the House of Peoples and the House of Representatives. The House of Peoples will have five Delegates from each of the ethnic groups, to be elected by their legislatures at the Entity level. Election of the forty-two members of the House of Representatives will be pursuant to an election law to be passed by the Parliamentary Assembly except that the first election will take place in accordance with Annex 3 to the General Framework Agreement. The Parliamentary Assembly has the power to enact legislation, decide upon the sources and amounts of revenues, approve budgets to be proposed by the Presidency for the operation of the national institutions, and ratify treaties.
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The Presidency consists of one Bosniac, one Croat, and one Serb, whose election will be pursuant to an election law to be passed by the Parliamentary Assembly except that the first election will take place in accordance with Annex 3 to the General Framework Agreement. The Presidency has the power to nominate the Chair of the Council of Ministers which will carry out the policies and decisions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although not crystal clear, this Council appears to be a "ministerial" organ and has no policy-making power. The Presidency has the power to conduct foreign policy, appoint ambassadors and envoys, represent Bosnia and Herzegovina internationally, negotiate and denounce, and, with consent of the Parliamentary Assembly, ratify treaties, and execute decisions of the Parliamentary As- 52 The power of this Committee is not specified but the term "coordinate" obviously does not imply "command." Any decision will depend upon the good faith of the members of the Presidency.
The Constitutional Court will have nine members. 53 It will have original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising under the New Constitution between the Entities, between one Entity and Bosnia and Herzegovina, or between the national institutions. It will also have appellate jurisdiction over a judgement of any other court and referral jurisdiction over any question referred by any other court, if the issue relates to the New Constitution.
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The Central Bank will be "the sole authority for issuing currency and for monetary policy throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina." 55 This apparently forbids the Entities from issuing their own currency and prevents them from having their own monetary policy. The detailed responsibilities will be determined by the Parliamentary Assembly.
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D. General Comments
The core values and the legal system are conducive to nation-building and promoting a common market within Bosnia and Herzegovina. Democracy and the protection of human rights will help heal the wounds of the people. The guarantee of freedom of movement of persons, goods and capital, although having a human rights connotation, is no doubt geared towards building a common market.
57 This guarantee is strong and is capable of being strengthened through judicial interpretation, as the experience of its counterpart in the European Union shows, 58 and will probably Finally, there is no national law enforcement mechanism. Although the New Constitution grants the national institutions the power to decide on the inter-Entity co-operation in criminal law enforcement, it creates no mechanism for uniform national law enforcement and thus leaves it to the Parliamentary Assembly and the Presidency to decide. As discussed in Part III below, these national institutions may be paralysed. While the New Constitution requires the Entities to maintain civilian whose constantly expanding case law widened the field of Community rights and struck down many barriers to trade").
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The New Constitution, art. I(7)(d).
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law enforcement agencies, 63 leaving law enforcement to them may prove hazardous. Open defiance or sly arguments may hinder the operation of the rule of law. The recent dispute on the kidnapping of Bosnian civilians is a prime example.
64 It appears that international pressure is necessary for the purposes of law enforcement, a precarious state of affairs, to say the least. The presence of the International Police Task Force 65 may alleviate the situation somewhat, but its mandate is limited and its presence will be short-lived. In light of the importance of the matter, it is hoped that the authorities will bury their differences and establish a national law enforcement mechanism.
Ethnic Sovereignty and Potential Breakdowns in Decisionmaking
The weak national powers granted by the New Constitution to the national institutions may be further weakened if not completely debilitated by the potential breakdowns in the decision-making process of these institutions. The potential problem comes from the phenomenon I have referred to as "ethnic sovereignty" in the composition and decision-making process of the national institutions. In each of the national institutions, each of the constituent peoples, the Bosniacs, the Croats and the Serbs, as opposed to simply the territorial components in other federal nations, is represented essentially equally, and, other than in the Central Bank and the Constitutional Court, each group has essentially a veto power over all essential decisionmaking therein. This structure presumably was intended to ensure equality of the ethnic groups, but wittingly or unwittingly it gives each ethnic group the ultimate decision-making power in any matters it considers important to it. In this sense, each group enjoys sovereignty. This ethnic sovereignty if fully utilised will ultimately paralyse the national institutions.
A. The Parliamentary Assembly
Ethnic sovereignty prevails in the Parliamentary Assembly. The Assembly consists of the House of Peoples and the House of Representatives.
66 All legislation will require the approval of both chambers 67 and accordingly each chamber may prevent any decision from being made.
The House of Representatives is designed to represent the population at large and conducts its business with a quorum consisting of a majority of all mem- bers. 68 Decisions in this House will normally be taken by majority of those present and voting, but a two-thirds majority of the Members from the territory of either Entity (rather than ethnic group) may block a measure. 69 This means that either the Bosniacs or the Croats separately as a group may not have enough votes to veto a decision in this House, unless either group elects two-thirds of all members from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Together these two groups (including where both agree on the matter under consideration, or where they disagree but one group wins enough members from the other to constitute a two-thirds majority) have a veto. The Serbs from Republika Srpska as a group, however, will have a veto.
However, the House of Peoples is designed to represent the ethnic groups as groups rather than the population at large and it is there where ethnic sovereignty is most likely to rear its ugly head. Each of the ethnic groups will have equal representation in the House of Peoples. The House of Peoples will have fifteen Delegates, five Croats and five Bosniacs to be selected, respectively, by the Croat and Bosniac Delegates to the House of Peoples of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and five Serbs by the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska.
70 This equal representation does not provide any group with a veto power but the quorum requirement does. The New Constitution provides that a quorum must include at least three Bosniac, three Croat and three Serb Delegates.
71 Should any group intend to block any proposed legislation, its Delegates need only absent themselves. Such a mechanism is easy to take advantage of and must be tempting to those who are inclined to abuse it. This assures each ethnic group the ultimate decision-making power in the Parliamentary Assembly.
Once the Delegates are present, decisions will normally be taken by majority of those present and voting. It will take two-thirds or more of the Delegates from either Entity (rather than ethnic group) to block a decision. 72 In addition, a majority of the Delegates from each group may declare a legislative measure destructive of a vital interest of its ethnic group, but that declaration does not in itself defeat the measure; it will merely initiate a procedure for negotiation and compromises. If that procedure fails, the matter will be sent to the Constitutional Court for review which is limited to procedural regularity. 73 This limitation on the Court's jurisdiction obviously is designed to protect the supremacy of the substantive decisions of the legislature but is bound to be controversial. To the extent that this limitation adversely affects human rights and fundamental freedoms, it probably is invalid. 74 
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Ibid., ait. IV(2). 69
Ibid., an. IV(3)(d Article V(2)(d) provides that "[a] dissenting member may declare a decision to be destructive of vital interest of the Entity from the territory from which he was elected." 77 Once such a declaration has been made, the decision will be referred to "the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska, if the declaration was made by the Member from that Territory; to the Bosniac Delegates of the House of the Peoples of the Federation, if the declaration was made by the Bosniac Member; or to the Croat Delegates of that body, if the declaration was made by the Croat Member."
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If the declaration is confirmed by a two-thirds vote of the respective persons widiin ten days of the referral, the challenged decision will have no effect. 79 The language "vital interest of the Entity" is in effect the "vital interest of the ethnic group" because a Bosniac declaration will be voted upon only by the Bosniac Delegates in the Federation and a Croat declaration, by the Croat Delegates only.
This power to declare a decision destructive to the interest of an ethnic group is apparently designed to enable each ethnic group's representative in the Presidency to protect the vital interest of that group. The confirmation process ensures that such a declaration truly represent the position of the ethnic group. Together, mey ensure that each group have a veto and thus a final say in the Presidency.
C. The Central Bank
The Central Bank will have for six years a first Governing Board consisting of one outside Governor to be appointed by the International Monetary Fund, who may not be a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina or any neighbouring State, and three members appointed by the Presidency, two from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (one Bosniac and one Croat) sharing one vote, and one from Republika Srpska. 80 The Governor may cast a tie-breaking vote. 81 After the first six years, the Governing Board will consist of five members to be appointed by the Presidency.
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The New Constitution does not specify any eligibility or quorum requirements, which thus need to be determined in the future.
It is thus clear that none of the ethnic groups will have a veto power in the decision-making process of the Central Bank and in the first six years it will be immune from impasses. However, ethnic sovereignty will still prevail here. The responsibilities of the Bank will be determined by the Parliamentary Assembly. 83 The appointment of the members after six years will be completely controlled by the Presidency. Both the Parliamentary Assembly and the Presidency will have to combat the veto power of each group.
D. The Constitutional Court
The composition and decision-making process of the Constitutional Court do not strictly follow the pattern of the other institutions, although ethnicity figures prominently even in this judicial organ. Out of the nine members of the Court, six will be internal judges who must be eligible voters and thus must be citizens and residents of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 84 Four of the internal judges will be selected by the House of Representatives of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, two by the Assembly of Republika Srpska. 85 The remaining three will be outside judges, who may not be citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina or any neighbouring State, to be appointed by the President of the European Court of Human Rights after consultation with the Presidency. 86 In the future the Parliamentary Assembly may provide another method of selecting the three outside judges. 87 Strictly speaking, the four judges to be selected by the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina need not be divided equally between the Bosniacs and the Croats and thus the three ethnic groups may not be represented equally on the Court.
One can only speculate as to why even the composition of this judicial organ is still so ethnically oriented, except for the three outside judges. The ideal of justice should be that ethnicity plays no part in judicial decision-making, whatever one may say about legislative and executive decision-making, and that judges act only in their individual capacity to hand out justice impartially and conscientiously. The New Constitution does not so provide expressly, but one may infer this from the requirement that judges be jurists of high moral standing. 88 Even if the New Constitution is silent on this point, one must not forget that this ideal is inherent in any exercise of judicial power.
Finally, the composition of the Court and the quorum requirement are such that no one ethnic group will have a veto power at the Court. The New Constitution provides that a majority of all judges constitute a quorum and thus two internal judges together with the three outside judges will be able to conduct business. 89 As the New Constitution does not specify the voting requirement for decision-mak- ing, presumably decisions will be made by majority of those voting.
90 Theoretically the three outside judges voting as a block against the other two in a possible quorum of five may decide the outcome of certain cases. 91 Consequently, the impasses that may plague the legislature and executive branches will not visit upon the Court.
E. General Comments
The ethnic sovereignty prevailing in the legislative and executive branches of the government is likely to paralyse the government and ultimately the nation. The leitmotif underlying ultimate decision-making in both of these branches is not democracy but ethnicity. To this extent, it conflicts with the democratic principles enshrined in Article 1(2), although the election of members to these bodies may to some extent be based on democracy. Although it has the seductive appeal of ensuring equality of the ethnic groups, it is ultimately a mild form of racism. As such, ethnic sovereignty does not help foster one people for one nation but will keep three peoples separate and divide their allegiance. It affords each group the chance to bring down the whole nation, and if history is any guide, it is possible that one of them will. One need only look at the dissolution of the former Czechoslovakia, 92 if the fate of the former Yugoslavia is not sufficient proof.
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Free from the potential impasses that may haunt the legislative and the executive branches, the Constitutional Court and the Central Bank, if taking an activist and instrumental view, may provide in certain circumstances some remedy for the potential ills in the governmental structure. However, this is not cause for optimism. The Central Bank's responsibilities are to be assigned by the Parliamentary Assembly which may be paralysed. The Court has its inherent limitations and cannot take over the competencies of other branches. It also will be handicapped by the lack of a national law enforcement mechanism. Its orders may risk defiance. More important, a
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The New Constitution does not provide a voting requirement in deciding cases, but it should be presumed that it is by majority. The Court may provide for this in its rules to be made under Article VI(2).
91
The presence of the outside judges alone, not to mention their theoretical power to decide the outcome of cases, is rather extraordinary and no doubt will be considered foreign assistance by some and foreign intervention by others. It may not please the people to have foreigners sitting on their highest court, but it may be anecessary evil at present. It is hoped that the outside judges will not only be "jurists of high moral standing," the New Constitution, art. VI(l)(b), but also will have an intimate knowledge of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina so that they will not wander too far from the pains and aspirations of the citizens, or worse, impose their "foreign views" on the local population. government of juristocracy has its drawbacks and will defeat the democratic principles that the New Constitution champions because the judges are not democratically elected.
IV. Conclusion
Constitutions can never be perfect. This unfortunate fact has been pointed out by prominent scholars 94 and has perhaps found proof in the New Constitution. Some of the imperfections may be remedied. Some others, such as the structural problems in the decision-making process, may not, and these remain a potential eruption which may paralyse the government. '
Making predictions about a future life at the time of its birth has its perils, particularly in the case of a constitution. The words of a New Constitution, we must keep in mind, "have called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters."
95 Its interpretation by judicial bodies may result in improvement. Potential problems may be prevented by public-spiritedness or comprises made under international pressure. The classic ideal of a government, especially the legislative branch, is that it consists of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably. We can only hope that the constitutional players will act in the best interests of all concerned. 
